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Abstract 
The work of Feldstein (1995, 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in 
economists‟ approaches to analysing taxpayers‟ behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. 
Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax 
compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to 
identify the extent of tax non-compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. 
In this context, measures of „tax gaps‟ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential 
tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax 
non-compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper we argue that the tax gap 
as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses 
by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural 
responses, exaggerate the degree of non-compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes 
(such as the „VAT-gap‟) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap 
measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax 
base reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be 
anticipated from the tax gap estimate. 
 
1. Introduction 
The seminal contributions of Feldstein (1995, 1999) have stimulated substantial conceptual and 
empirical advances in public economists‟ approaches to analysing taxpayers‟ behavioural responses to 
changes in tax rates (see, for example, Saez, 2001; Chetty, 2009; Saez et al. 2012; Creedy and 
Gemmell, 2013). A largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax 
compliance has also developed in recent years. This latter literature (see, for example, IMF, 2013a; 
OECD, 2012, Shaw et al. 2010) has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of 
tax non-compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance behaviour. In this 
context, measures of „tax gaps‟ – generally, the difference between actual tax collected and the 
potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures 
of tax non-compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. 
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In this paper we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because 
it fails to capture those behavioural responses by taxpayers analysed in the Feldstein-related literature. 
We show that tax gap measures both for indirect taxes (such as the „VAT-gap‟) and direct (income) 
taxes, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non-compliance. 
Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax 
compliance rate, they will likely serve to reduce the tax base and hence potentially have a tax 
revenue-lowering effect which will counteract the anticipated additional revenue via greater 
compliance effort. 
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 defines the tax gap and 
behavioural response measures in more detail and summarises the recent contributions of the two 
literatures described above. Section 3 then provides a simple model of the tax gap that integrates the 
insights from the „behavioural responses‟ literature and Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Tax gap and taxpayer behavioural response definitions 
Tax evasion is both pervasive and endemic and has been the subject of a great deal of economic 
modelling since the early contribution of Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
1
 Despite explicit modelling 
of taxpayer behaviour in these models, and numerous studies‟ attempts to estimate their extent, the 
literature on defining and estimating tax gaps has generally ignored these behavioural responses. This 
may in part reflect the characteristic of many of the tax evasion models which treat the total potential 
tax base as given and address the question of what determines the fraction of that base that is hidden 
from tax. Conventional tax gap measures can be thought of as capturing this sort of non-compliance. 
Recent modelling of taxpayer responses to tax rate changes, following Feldstein (1995, 1999), 
has however focused on shifts in the total tax base for a particular tax. This literature has mainly 
considered income taxes and derived expressions, and estimates, for the responsiveness of taxable 
income (and, by extension, tax revenue) to marginal tax rate changes. The usual measure of this 
responsiveness is the „elasticity of taxable income‟ (ETI) – the proportionate change in taxable 
income in response to a given proportionate change in the „net-of-tax‟ rate (one minus the tax rate). 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Feinstein (1991, 1999) and the reviews by Andreoni et al. (1998) and Sandmo (2005). 
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By using the net-of-tax rate, rather than the tax rate, the ETI is expected to be positive in the presence 
of behavioural responses. 
The ETI has been shown to provide a simple yet powerful tool in the analysis of the revenue and 
welfare (deadweight cost) effects of tax rate changes. Saez et al. (2012), for example, highlight the 
difference between the „mechanical‟ and „behavioural‟ revenue responses to a tax rate change. The 
mechanical effect describes the revenue change consequent on a tax rate change in the absence of an 
associated behavioural change. Observed revenue changes reflect the combination of both responses, 
with the behavioural effect summarised by the ETI and the elasticity of revenue with respect to 
taxable income changes. This latter elasticity is a function of the tax structure; see Creedy and 
Gemmell (2013). 
The relevance of the ETI literature for tax compliance measurement is that, the effective marginal 
tax rate (EMTR) that an individual faces can be thought of as a combination of the statutory marginal 
tax rate, t, and the extent of compliance. In the next section we specify the proportion of the (total or 
any additional) tax base that is declared, or otherwise observed, for tax purposes as . Hence, we can 
think of the effective marginal tax rate as t. That is, if a non-compliant taxpayer experiences an 
increase in their tax base (say, taxable income) then they will pay a fraction t on that additional 
income, rather than the fully compliant fraction t. The ETI literature generally argues that it is changes 
in this EMTR, not just the statutory rate, which acts as an incentive for behavioural responses. As a 
result, a change in either the statutory rate, t, or the „compliance rate‟, , could be expected to 
generate a behavioural response.
2
 
This need not imply that the responses to changes in each of these EMTR components,  and t, 
are the same. For example, Chetty et al. (2009) and others have argued recently that some tax rates 
may be more salient, or „visible‟, to taxpayers than others, with the result that taxpayers respond to 
perceived tax rates rather than actual rates.
3
 As a result the extent of any behavioural responses could 
differ in association with different tax types or, in our case, responses could differ to changes in  or t 
                                                 
2
 There are, of course, other determinants of effective rates, such as deductions against tax, or social welfare payments, 
which are withdrawn at a „taper‟ rate. 
3
 They analyse the specific case of US state-level excises and sales taxes which are added to the price of goods at retail 
outlets, but where some taxes are stated explicitly on the shelf or price label while others are simply added at check-out; see 
Chetty et al., 2009, for details. 
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depending on how aware each taxpayer is regarding the impact that each tax/compliance „rate‟ has on 
his/her effective marginal rate. 
The literature on tax gap measurement has also expanded in recent years. In particular, increasing 
awareness of erosion of key tax bases in advanced economies (in response to such changes as 
globalization, factor mobility and increasing public indebtedness following the global financial crisis) 
has stimulated an increased focus within tax agencies on measuring the extent of avoidance or 
evasion. International organisations such as the OECD and IMF are also increasingly examining and 
proposing methods to estimate „tax gaps‟ – broadly the difference between revenue actually raised 
and potential revenue that would be raised if non-compliance was reduced or eliminated e.g., HMRC 
(2011, 2012, 2013) OECD (2012), IMF (2013a). Separately, Gemmell and Hasseldine (2012) review 
the various tax gap definitions and their use in practice, measurement methods and prior estimates and 
IMF (2013b) provides a detailed review specifically for the U.K. 
These „tax gap‟ measures are also increasingly popular as a means of assessing the degree of 
success with which a particular tax or tax system is implemented, and have been proposed as possible 
performance indicators for tax collection agencies. Given observed tax revenues, the key component 
of tax gap measures is the unobservable „theoretical‟ or hypothetical tax base and revenue that would 
be expected without evasion or avoidance.
4
 
There are several possible definitions of the tax gap. Most have been developed within tax 
agencies to capture the aggregate tax revenue lost through non-compliance (for a specific tax or tax 
system). In the U.S. the „official‟ IRS definition is simply: “The difference between the tax that 
taxpayers should pay and what they actually pay on a timely basis”.5 Plumley (2005) notes that this 
defined gap is split into three components: non-filing (failure to file a return), under-reporting (of 
income, and also overstating of deductions), and under-payment (failure to fully pay reported taxes 
owed).
6
 
                                                 
4 For tax base measures at a high level of aggregation, the methods currently used are often based on measures of the „hidden 
economy‟ or „hidden income‟. Almost all of the methods proposed or implemented are subjected to the same criticism of 
ignoring consideration of behavioural response. See Gemmell and Hasseldine (2012) for further discussion. 
5 See http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/tax_gap_facts-figures.pdf 
6 Other definitions of the tax gap found in the literature include those employed by, for example, Giles (1997; 1999), who 
first define the „hidden economy‟ or „hidden income‟. This is designed to capture income that is earned but is hidden from 
the tax authorities and, usually, official statisticians. The tax gap is then defined as hidden income multiplied by a suitable 
tax rate. This raises numerous conceptual and measurement issues, such as: what is included in hidden income, and what is a 
„suitable‟ tax rate? 
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The IRS definition of the tax gap, as well as definitions used by other tax agencies, all attempt to 
capture the notion of revenue losses through non-compliance with the tax code. However, 
conventional tax gap measures do not formally consider how the „theoretical‟ tax base from which the 
theoretical tax liability is calculated, may differ when tax agencies alter enforcement policy to change 
the extent of non-compliance, compared to estimates based on the current extent of non-compliance. 
That is, they ignore behavioural responses that may alter taxpayers‟ total „theoretical‟ tax base or 
liability rather than simply the fraction of a given total base that is declared for tax collection 
purposes. 
However, since an extra dollar raised in tax revenue via greater compliance enforcement 
represents an increase in the taxpayer‟s effective marginal tax rate, this need not necessarily reduce 
the tax gap by a dollar. The „one for one‟ condition is achieved only if the „theoretical‟ tax base is 
unaffected by changes in the effective tax rate. If the arguments and evidence from the ETI literature 
are accepted, greater compliance success and/or higher statutory tax rates which raise the taxpayer‟s 
effective tax rate will tend, ceteris paribus, to reduce the total tax base (as distinct from changes which 
affect only the extent to which a given tax base is hidden). 
 
3. Modelling tax gaps in the presence of behavioural responses 
This section considers the consequences for tax gap estimates of ignoring taxpayers‟ behavioural 
responses.
7
 It demonstrates that omitting behavioural responses biases conventional tax gap measures 
upwards, for both direct and indirect taxes, and can provide a perverse measure of the success of 
efforts to improve compliance. 
Consider the following simple tax compliance model. Actual (observed) tax paid can be defined 
as: 
      (1) 
where B is the observed tax base (e.g. taxable incomes net of any deductions available as off-sets 
against that income); t is the average (and marginal) tax rate applicable to base, B, and T is actual tax 
revenue raised. If some tax base is hidden from taxation then we may define: 
                                                 
7 Perhaps unfortunately the term „theoretical‟ ( rather than „hypothetical‟) tax liability has become common usage in a 
number of tax agencies; see, for example HMRC (2012) who use the abbreviation „VTTL‟ for the „VAT Theoretical Tax 
Liability‟. 
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       (2) 
where B
*
 is the total tax base including that which is hidden and 0 ≤  ≤ 1 is the proportion observed 
and taxable, with (1 – the proportion hidden from tax. For tax gap calculations in practice, B is 
observable but, whenever < 1, B* may or may not be observable. In some cases independent 
information on the total tax base, B
*
, may be available, such as from consumer expenditure surveys or 
information on taxpayer incomes from sources independent of the tax authority). In such cases,  
may be estimated as a residual from B and B
*
. Where there is no independent information on B
*
, then 
compliance intelligence is typically used to calculate B
*
 from information on B and , such as that 
shown in (2). While (2) is something of a simplification of the relationship used for tax gap 
measurement in practice, it captures the essential property that the theoretical maximum base is 
obtained by „scaling-up‟ the observed base using non-compliance fractions inferred from compliance 
intelligence data such as audit outcomes. 
Combining (1) and (2) gives actual tax revenue of: 
        (3) 
so that the „true‟ effective marginal (= average) tax rate that the taxpayer faces is dT/dB* = T/B* = t 
≤ t, except in the extreme full-compliance case where = 1. 
Labelling the conventional tax gap measure as G
*
, this can be defined as:        , where T* is 
the maximum potential, or „theoretical‟ tax revenue with full compliance at tax rate, t, applied to the 
observed tax base, B. Hence, using equations (1) - (3): 
     (    )  (   )    {
(   )
 
}     (4) 
where (4) also uses T
*
 = tB
*
. Thus, for a given total tax base, the tax gap increases if the tax rate rises 
or the compliance rate worsens ( declines). 
When conventional tax gap measures are used to judge the success of compliance efforts – which 
typically is their main purpose – a common presumption with such measures is that, in response to a 
change in compliance success, , the theoretical tax base, B*, and tax liability, T*, are unchanged. 8 For 
                                                 
8
 In the analysis which follows we do not formally model compliance effort, e, since this is not required for the argument we 
wish to make. However, conceptually it is straightforward to consider as a function of e, such that the tax revenue, or tax 
gap, responses of interest become (dT/d)(d/de) or are (dG/d)(d/de). If effort is defined in currency units ($x or £x spent 
on activities to raise compliance, for example) then a reasonable minimum condition for „success‟ might be (dT/d)(d/de). 
> 1. That is, an additional £1 of effort generates more than a £1 increase in the tax revenue. 
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a given tax rate, if the compliance rate changes, dT
*
 = 0 and dG
*
/d = (dT* – dT)/d = –dT/d. That 
is, an extra dollar raised in revenue as a result of increased compliance reduces the tax gap, G
*
, by a 
dollar. 
Unfortunately this condition, dG
*
/d = –dT/d, only holds if the total hypothetical tax base, B*, is 
unaffected by changes in compliance success, .9 However, as argued earlier, greater compliance 
success and/or higher statutory tax rates can both be expected to raise the taxpayer‟s effective 
marginal tax rate. The ETI literature proposes that these can be expected to elicit tax base reducing 
responses; such that:
 
 
      (   ) where                        (5)10 
That is, increases in either the actual marginal tax rate or the compliance rate (both of which raise the 
effective marginal tax rate) reduces the maximum tax base to which that rate can be applied. The ETI 
literature has produced various estimates for these responses to effective or statutory marginal tax 
rates across a range of taxes; see Saez et al. (2012) for a review of estimates. 
As a result, the so-called „theoretical tax liability‟, obtained by multiplying the observed tax base 
when  < 1 by the tax rate, t, would not be expected to be observed, were the revenue authority 
successful in eliminating non-compliance. Crucially, it is the total tax base, B
*
 (as distinct from the 
fraction of the tax base that is hidden), that is hypothesized in (5) to respond to t and . 
The conventional tax gap measure, G
*
, therefore captures the „missing‟ revenue that would have 
been raised from the observed base, B, scaled up by the current compliance rate  (that is: B* = B/), 
and without any responses of that base to the change in compliance. However whenever this 
theoretical base, derived when  < 1, is different from that which would be observed were compliance 
actually to increase to  = 1, then G* is a misleading measure of missing revenue that can potentially 
be collected. Rather, G
*
 represents revenue missing from the current base, only some of which could 
be collected were the system to achieve  = 1. 
                                                 
9
 A similar argument applies if  is held constant and t changes; i.e. dG/dt = -dT/dt: the induced change in the tax gap is 
equal to minus the change in tax revenue. 
10 Higher statutory tax rates may also encourage greater non-compliance; that is, d/dt < 0. Thus, if taxpayers‟ non-
compliance is proportionately greater (lower ) at higher tax rates, governments may have to expend additional resources to 
keep  constant when tax rates rise, and vice versa. 
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The property of the conventional tax gap measure, G
*
, that dG
*
/d = –dT/d therefore gives a 
false impression that an additional dollar of revenue raised via improved compliance will reduce the 
tax gap by a dollar (whenever dT
*
/d ≠ 0). In fact, as shown below, when dT*/d ≠ 0, relative to a 
„true‟ measure of the tax gap, G* overestimates the size of the current tax gap. It also overestimates 
the amount of additional revenue that can be raised via increased compliance, but underestimates the 
rate at which the „true‟ tax gap closes as compliance increases. 
 
Improving tax gap measures 
To overcome this tax gap mis-measurement problem, we can define a new tax gap measure, G
**
, as: 
      (      ) (6) 
where B
**
 is defined as the tax base that would be observed at  = 1, and B0 is the (currently) observed 
tax base when the (current) compliance rate,  < 1. B
**
 is also the maximum potential tax base, for a 
given tax rate.
11
This maximum tax base, B
**
, can also be written in terms of the definition above of B
*
, and 
differences from B
*
 associated with the increase in  Thus: 
       
  {
   
  
  }  
Where „0‟ subscripts represent initial values, and from (2), B0
*
 = B0/. The term {
   
  
  } is the 
change in B0
*
 when  increase from  to 1; i.e.  = 1. These changes are represented here as 
discrete changes, , since they reflect non-marginal changes in , from its observed value to its 
maximum of one. Equation (7) can be further expressed in terms of the „elasticity‟ of B0
*
 with respect 
to changes in ,    
   
  
  
  
    and after some rearranging, gives: 
       
 (  
    
  
  ) (8) 
Substituting (8) into (6), and using B0
*
 = B0then gives: 
        
 (  
    
  
     )     {
    
  
} (  
  
  
)  
                                                 
11
 This ceteris paribus condition is required if, as argued by the ETI literature, dB**/dt ≠ 0. 
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Note that the elasticity, *, measures the extent to which the maximum potential tax base 
obtained from equation (2), and which feeds into the conventional tax gap measure, changes when  is 
raised from its current value to equal one. It is expected to be negative in the presence of tax base 
behavioural responses: full compliance generates a lower theoretical tax base than that obtained 
„mechanically‟ as B0
*
 = B0/. Using equation (4), allows equation (9) to be expressed in terms of the 
conventional tax gap: 
       (  
  
  
) (10) 
Equation (10) thus demonstrates that a tax gap measure that allows for tax base behavioural 
responses will be lower than the conventional gap measure, G
*
, as long as * < 0. Indeed, if the 
absolute value of * is greater than the compliance rate, , then 
*
/ < 1 and G
**
 becomes negative. 
That is, if compliance was increased from current levels so that all non-compliance was eliminated, 
the resulting loss of tax base would yield a maximum hypothetical (= actual) tax revenue less than 
current revenue. Equation (10) also highlights that a „true‟ tax gap measure is lower, both absolutely 
and relative to G
**
, when the initial compliance rate, , is lower, since this generates a larger (more 
negative) value of */.  
From equation (8) it can also be inferred that tax revenues with full compliance are expected to 
be lower using a „true‟ measure. Equation (8) shows the relationship between the two definitions of 
the „full compliance tax base‟ (B** and B*) which, for a given tax rate, t, also shows the relationship 
between the two measures of full compliance tax revenues. It can be seen that, since the „true‟ full 
compliance tax base, B
**
, will be lower than B
*
, then the increase in actual tax revenues from current 
values (T0) to full compliance levels must be less than estimated using B
*
, as long as * < 0. 
The two tax gap definitions can be illustrated with the help of Figure 1. This shows the 
compliance rate, , on the horizontal axis, and the tax base, B, on the vertical axis, for a given tax 
rate. Consider an initial compliance rate,  = 0.5, so that the observed tax base is B1, at point D. The 
conventional tax gap measure (based on B1, and B
*
 when  1) is simply obtained as a linear 
extrapolation along the broken line ODH till  1. This gives G1
*
/t (= (B
*  B0)) as the distance CD, 
equal to FH. 
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However, if the maximum tax base declines with increases in  this will cause the tax base at  
1 to lie below H, such as at point E.  This depicts the behavioural response, *, as the discrete vertical 
drop from C to E, as  increases from C to H. It can be seen that this gives the „true‟ gap in the tax 
base, G1
**
/t, equal to the distance FE, instead of FH.  However, if the line CE sloped down sufficiently 
(a lower – i.e. more negative – elasticity,*), it can be seen that the point E could lie below F; namely 
a negative tax gap: G1
**
/t < 0 and hence G1
**
 < 0. This represents a case where the condition */ < 
1 above holds. 
While for most taxes, the notion of a negative tax gap may seem unlikely, it could be relevant for 
in some circumstances. For example, if corporate investment or declared profits by multinational 
companies are very sensitive to the effective tax rates they face, such companies may be prepared to 
pay corporate tax at a given statutory rate as long as compliance enforcement is limited, keeping their 
effective average and marginal rates low. However, where a substantial enforced increase in 
compliance by those multinationals induces a high degree of capital flight or profit shifting in 
response to the higher effective rates, total tax revenues with so-called „full compliance‟ could yield 
lower revenues than with the initially lower effective tax rates. 
Figure 1 also shows the tax gaps calculated from a lower initial compliance rate,  = 0.25. This 
gives a taxed base of B0 at point I, and a conventional measure of the full-compliance tax base, B0
*
 = 
B1
*
, at point A (= H). Applying the same value of * as previously now generates a value of B0
**
 less 
than B1
**
: hence point J lies below E. This reflects that the estimates of a full-compliance tax base, 
when based on a lower current value of compliance (), involve a larger increase in compliance and 
hence a larger decline in the associated maximum tax base, B0
**
. As a result, a conventional tax gap 
would be based on the distance HK in Figure 1 instead of the „true‟ gap based on the distance JK. In 
addition, because the trajectory of the actual tax base, B, in Figure 1 would be from D to E, not D to H 
(when  rises from 0.5 to 1), or from I to J, not I to H (when  rises from 0.25 to 1), observed 
revenue increases must also be less that would be expected from the conventional tax gap measure. 
Figure 1 and the expressions for the tax gaps above, are all predicated on a constant tax rate, t. It 
is however important to remember that if, from (5),         , then the derived tax base and tax 
gap estimates are conditional on the current tax rate. Thus, for example, the vertical position of points 
12 
 
such as A, C, E, H and J in Figure 1 are determined by the tax rate, t. An increase in the statutory tax 
rate, when         , not only increases revenue via the mechanical application of a higher tax rate 
to the current tax base, but also involves a simultaneous downward shift in B
**
 values in Figure 1 
because the higher rate, ceteris paribus, lowers the tax base. Hence the tax gap measure, G
**
, at any 
given  also depends on t indirectly via tax base changes, as well as directly. The conventional 
measure fails to account for this indirect effect. 
To illustrate possible magnitudes, consider a tax rate of t = 0.25, a compliance rate,  = 0.5, and 
an observed tax base of 500 units. A conventional tax gap measure yields a theoretical maximum tax 
base, B
*
 = 1000 (500/0.5), with maximum tax revenue with full compliance of T
*
 = 250, and tax 
collected, T = 125. The tax gap, G
*
, is therefore 125. If, instead,  = 0.9, the conventional tax gap 
would be 250  (0.25 x 0.9 x 1000) = 25.  
Table 1 shows values of the two tax gap measures, G
*
 and G
**
, for different assumed compliance 
rates and tax base elasticity values, *. When * = 0, the two measures are the same, as shown in row 
1 of the table: G
*
 and G
**
 both fall from 125 at  = 0.5, to 25 at  = 0.9. Lower rows in the table show 
the case where * < 0 over the range –0.1 to –1. The conventional tax gap, G*, is unchanged at its row 
1 values, while G
**
 is reduced. 
A value of * = –0.1 indicates that an increase in the compliance rate from, say, 0.5 to full 
compliance ( = 1.0; a 100% rise) would reduce the theoretical tax base (1000 at  = 0.5) by 10%, to 
900. Maximum tax revenue is therefore 0.25 x 900 = 225, compared to actual revenue at  = 0.5 of 
125. Hence the „true‟ tax gap is not 125 but is G** = 100 as shown in row 2 of the table, for  = 0.5. 
The „true‟ tax gap is therefore around 20% lower than the conventional measure at these values of  
and *. With a higher initial compliance rate such as  = 0.9, the „true‟ tax gap, at 22 is around 12% 
lower than the conventional measure (= 25). 
[Table 1 to go here] 
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Table 1. Tax gap measures with/without tax base behavioural responses (in £) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Not surprisingly, Table 1 shows that larger behavioural responses via lower * values, reduce the 
G
**
 absolutely and relative to G
*
 in row 1. As predicted earlier, these become negative at especially 
low values of * and . For example, at compliance rates below 50%, the „true‟ tax gap becomes 
negative for  values less (more negative) than around 0.5. 
Of course, identifying suitable values of  for individual taxes is crucial if the conventional tax 
gap measure is to be adapted to allow for these tax base behavioural responses when estimating tax 
gaps in practice. The existing ETI literature provides some guidance on empirical values (see Saez et 
al., 2012), but these are typically for personal income taxes, and a few for corporate income taxes. 
However they generally relate to responses to statutory or effective tax rates with the implication for 
responses specifically to compliance rates unclear. They are also acknowledged to be specific to the 
institutional structure of the taxes in question. Results may therefore not carry over to similar taxes in 
different countries with somewhat different systems – for example, where anti-avoidance legislation 
or practice is different. 
In addition, little is currently known regarding how far taxpayer responses differ for a given 
increase in tax liability when this is due to a higher statutory rate versus a higher compliance rate. It 
seems at least plausible that for some taxes, changes in compliance effort and/or success are less 
visible to taxpayers than changes to explicit tax code parameters such as marginal rates, allowable 
Tax base 
responsiveness: 
compliance rate: (initial) 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 

0 225 200 175 150 125 100 75 50 25 
-0.1 0 100 117 113 100 83 64 44 22 
-0.2 -225 0 58 75 75 67 54 38 19 
-0.3 -450 -100 0 38 50 50 43 31 17 
-0.4 -675 -200 -58 0 25 33 32 25 14 
-0.5 -900 -300 -117 -38 0 17 21 19 11 
-0.6 -1125 -400 -175 -75 -25 0 11 13 8 
-0.7 -1350 -500 -233 -113 -50 -17 0 6 6 
-0.8 -1575 -600 -292 -150 -75 -33 -11 0 3 
-0.9 -1800 -700 -350 -188 -100 -50 -21 -6 0 
-1 -2025 -800 -408 -225 -125 -67 -32 -13 -3 
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deductions, exemptions, tax credits etc. If so, responses could be much more muted for the former 
compared to the latter.
12
 
 
The tax gap and the Laffer curve 
The previous section, and Figure 1, illustrated the case where tax revenues change in response to a 
change in the compliance rate, holding the tax rate constant. For tax rate changes, the Laffer curve – 
the „inverted-U‟ shaped relationship between tax revenues and the tax rate – is perhaps the best-
known device used to illustrate the adverse revenue response to tax rate increases. It‟s relevance to the 
current tax gap analysis can be seen by noting from equations (2) and (5) above that       (   ). 
Thus, increases in the effective tax rate, t, have a positive „mechanical‟ effect on total tax revenues 
and a negative „behavioural‟ effect via induced reductions in the tax base from changes in either 
component of the effective tax rate (   
   ⁄     
   ⁄   ). The net effect depends on the relative 
strengths of these two, but the Laffer curve proposes that the net effect is positive at low tax rates and 
negative at high tax rates.
13
 
Figure 2A illustrates a form of tax gap Laffer curve, but in (T, B
*
) space rather than (T, t) space, 
showing the relationship between total tax revenues, T, and the total potential tax base, B
*
. The 
horizontal axis represents the case of t = 0; that is, the tax rate and/or compliance rate are zero. For 
this „no-tax‟ case, let the exogenously determined tax base be X; tax revenue is of course zero. The 
45
o
 line represents the case of a fully enforced ( = 1) 100% tax rate (such that t = 1). At this 
extreme, standard Laffer arguments suggest tax revenue will also be zero, though an argument can be 
made that revenue may still be positive (though likely small).
14
 
The curve OX shows there is a maximum revenue (between O and X) associated with the 
relationship, T = tB*, as t rises from zero to one. Thus, with zero tax revenues at X when t = 0, 
persistent increases in  and/or t result in positive tax revenue but at a declining rate such that the 
negative behavioural effect eventually outweighs the mechanical effect – left of the maximum of the 
                                                 
12
 On the salience of different taxes to taxpayers, see Chetty et al. (2009). 
13 Typically, zero tax revenues are predicted at the two extreme tax rates of 0% and 100%, in the latter case because the 
penal rate eliminates the tax base. In practice zero revenue might result at tax rates below 100%. 
14 The usual argument for zero revenue is that complete appropriation of the tax base by the tax authorities makes it pointless 
for individuals to „earn‟ a positive amount of the tax base. However, depending on how tax revenues are used, some 
individuals may nevertheless be willing to see all of their income (or other tax base) taken by the government and continue 
to generate positive amounts. 
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curve OX. To simplify the exposition, we assume here that taxpayers respond identically to changes in 
 and changes in t, though as noted earlier this need not be the case (   
   ⁄     
   ⁄ ). Indeed, it 
might be expected that changes in statutory tax rates would be more visible, or „salient‟, to taxpayers 
than changes in the extent of compliance enforcement; hence behavioural responses may differ. 
Figure 2B illustrates an intermediate case. Consider an initial situation at point B, on the ray from 
the origin, OW, with a tax rate of t1 and a compliance rate of 1. This yields actual revenue of OC 
from a potential tax base of   
 ; the actual tax base is     
  (not shown). Possible tax revenues with 
full compliance ( = 1) for this case are given by the ray OZ from the origin. If the tax base were to 
remain unaltered with full compliance, an outcome at A, with tax revenues of OE would be expected. 
However, taxpayer responses result in an outcome at point J in Figure 2B. As a result the 
conventional estimate of the tax gap, AB = CE, is an overestimate of the true tax gap of CD. How 
much of an overestimate depends on the extent of tax base response as determined by the curve 
      (   ). 
Figure 2C shows the case where, for some tax and compliance rates, tax revenues can be smaller, 
or unchanged, when enforcement efforts succeed in eliminating all non-compliance. Consider an 
increase in the tax rate to t2 from an initial situation at point B. With the same compliance rate,  1, 
taxpayers move to L (not G). If non-compliance is eliminated, taxpayers move to K, yielding the same 
revenue, OC, as before the tax and compliance rate changes. Thus, the increased tax revenue delivered 
by the tax rate change, for given , is completely wiped out by the compliance “improvement”. The 
conventional measure of the tax gap, however, would show it falling from FB or FG to zero (where 
FB is the tax gap based on the tax base and revenue before both the tax rate and compliance 
changes).
15
 
Finally, the analysis above has focused on tax gap measures in units of tax revenue (e.g. in 
dollars, euro, yen etc.) and shown that they can be quite different. Tax gap estimates are often 
presented as percentages of total tax revenue raised: such as 100G/T or 100G/T
*
. As should now be 
clear, the tax revenue, T or T
*
, that can be expected following changes in tax rates or compliance, can 
be quite different from conventional „mechanical effect only‟ estimates. As a result percentage tax 
                                                 
15 Additional revenue expected from the tax increase with no change in compliance, when taxpayers‟ behavioural responses 
are ignored, is given by BG. If implemented, this tax rise would produce a lower tax base (at L) and tax gap given by the 
distance between L and a point on the ray OF vertically above L. 
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gap estimates could change in magnitude and even direction, quite differently from tax gap measures 
based on G alone. For example, the percentage gap could rise or fall even if there was no change in 
the gap measured in units of revenue. 
 
Indirect Tax Gaps 
The above analysis can be applied to any tax base – income, general consumption spending, or 
spending on specific goods or services such as tobacco, alcohol etc. In practice, „conventional‟ tax 
gap analysis as described above is most often applied to general and specific consumption taxes such 
as VAT and excises. This reflects a view that data to estimate the theoretical (full compliance) tax 
base are more readily available and reliable than for direct taxes such as on personal and corporate 
incomes. However, though estimates of behavioural responses to tax rates have typically been 
calculated for „taxable income‟ responses to personal (and, to a lesser extent, corporate) income taxes, 
the potential for behavioural responses to indirect tax changes could potentially be more relevant for 
tax gap analysis than those for direct income taxes. 
Consider the following simple example for tobacco taxation. Assume 1 million cigarettes are 
sold legally for $3 per unit, $1 of which is tax from an excise, yielding $1 million in tax revenue. A 
further 0.5 million smuggled cigarettes are sold without tax, at $2 per unit. A conventional tax gap 
estimate would suggest there is an additional potential $500,000 in tax revenue (0.5 million x $1). 
However, many cigarettes purchased illegally at $2 will no longer be bought when the price becomes 
$3. For example, those whose marginal valuation for cigarettes lies between $2 and $3 will smoke 
less or drop out of the market. Suppose formerly smuggled cigarette sales are cut in half when these 
are taxed and the price rises to $3, with sales of formerly legal cigarettes unaffected, implying 
additional tax revenue of only $250,000. That is, the „true‟ tax gap is only half that estimated using 
the conventional definition, and depends on taxpayers‟ behavioural responses to changes in  and t. 
The general case can be illustrated with the help of Figure 3. This shows the demand for 
cigarettes in price and quantity space. The pre-tax price is $2 which, if this was the final consumer 
price, would be associated with a demand of Q2. With an excise tax of $1 per unit of cigarettes, the 
tax-inclusive price becomes $3 and demand falls to Q1. With full tax compliance, revenue equals the 
area ABCD raised from a tax base of OQ1. 
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Now consider the case where cigarette smuggling occurs such that observed total demand for 
cigarettes could be as high as OQ2. In this case we would observe OQ1 cigarettes purchased legally at 
$3, with an additional Q1Q2 purchased illegally at $2. A conventional estimate of the tax gap would be 
the area BCEH, or as a ratio of current revenue: BCEH/ABCD. However, with full tax compliance all 
cigarettes are now sold at $3, such that demand for cigarettes contracts to OQ1. Hence zero additional 
revenue is raised as a result of a successful compliance campaign and the potential tax base has 
shrunk from OQ2 to OQ1 – the full amount of the previously non-compliant spending. 
At the opposite extreme, consider the case where all smuggled cigarettes (sold at $2 per unit prior 
to any compliance improvement), are consumed by individuals whose marginal valuation of each unit 
exceeds $3 rather than $2. An example is shown in Figure 4 where all smuggled cigarettes are 
purchased by OQ0 consumers. They happen to have the highest marginal valuations in this illustration 
but the argument applies to any consumers on the segment BJ of the demand curve. For this case, 
initial excise revenue is area GBCF, while area AGFD (equals area BHEC) is lost revenue due to 
smuggling. A fully successful compliance campaign that eliminates smuggling will yield additional 
revenue of AGFD on OQ0 cigarettes, and a „conventional‟ measure of the tax gap would be correct. 
The tax base, OQ1, is unchanged in this case. 
Between these two extremes, where some smuggled cigarettes are consumed by individuals with 
marginal valuations exceeding $3 and some by those with marginal valuations between $2 and $3, the 
„true‟ tax gap will lie between zero and the conventional estimate. In practice it seems likely that, 
before compliance improvements, many smuggled cigarettes will be consumed by those who value 
them at less than $3. Such consumers have a much stronger incentive to seek out smuggled supplies. 
Hence, for those goods where illegal demand for tax-free units is primarily derived from those who 
value them at less than the tax-inclusive price, conventional tax gap estimates are most likely to 
involve substantial over-estimation.
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Formally, it can be shown that the change in tax base resulting from the attempt to achieve full 
compliance depends directly on the Marshallian price elasticity of demand for the good. To analyse 
                                                 
16 For the case of tobacco in the UK, the illegality of this lost revenue can be questionable. For example, personal importing 
of relatively large quantities of tobacco products from other European Union countries is legally allowable at customs ports 
without paying excise tax provided that the amounts imported could reasonably be considered as for „personal use‟ (i.e. not 
for re-sale) in an annual period. In practice for many individuals this allows quantities far in excess of actual personal 
consumption to be legally imported with the excess subsequently sold illegally without tax being paid, at less than tax-
inclusive prices. 
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this we need only be concerned with the initially non-compliant – since the previously compliant face 
no change in their price as a result of the increased compliance effort. 
Consider the case where compliance effort involves applying the tax rate to the previously 
untaxed element of the tax base, (1 – )B*. This is the theoretical tax base of the non-compliant which, 
for an excise, is the quantity of the goods they purchase, labelled   
  below. This tax base responds 
negatively to the newly imposed tax. Define the tax-exclusive price as q and the tax-inclusive price as 
p, such that p = q + t, and p = t, where t = t for the previously non-compliant. Tax paid by the 
previously non-compliant,   , when all untaxed goods are subject to tax is therefore given by: 
       
  (
 
 
)    
       
  (11) 
where t is the excise, t’ is the tax-inclusive ad valorem rate equivalent of the excise: t’ = t/p. 
Differentiating (11), with respect to the excise, t, the change in tax revenue as a result of 
imposing the excise on   
  is given by: 
 
   
  
   
    
   
 
  
 (12) 
However, since t = p; and defining the price elasticity of demand by the non-compliant, for a 
discrete change in price, as   (
   
 
  
) (
 
  
 ), (12) can be re-arranged to give:
17
 
 
   
  
    
     
 (
 
 
) {
    
 
  
   
}    
       ] (13) 
In (13), the „mechanical‟ effect‟ of levying the excise on the non-compliant is given by   
  and the 
„behavioural effect‟ is given by   
    , which is negative if  < 0. The mechanical effect is, of course, 
the only element captured by the traditional tax gap measure. Also, from our definition of   
  (  
 )  , both the behavioural and mechanical responses are larger the greater the initial degree of non-
compliance, (   ). 
It can be seen from (13) that if  = 0, then there is no behavioural response, such that 
   
  
   
 . 
At the other extreme, 
   
  
  , if       ; that is,        . This latter expression captures the 
condition under which enforcement of the tax rate on the non-compliant yields no additional tax 
revenue; that is, the negative behavioural effect exactly cancels out the mechanical effect. At higher 
                                                 
17
 For simplicity of exposition we treat this price elasticity as common across all (non-compliant) taxpayers. 
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tax rates, or larger tax increases, this occurs at a lower (absolute) price elasticity. For example, at t’ = 
0.25 the critical value of  is  –4, whereas when t’ = 0.5 the critical value falls to  = –2. 
Conventional tax gap measures, ceteris paribus, are therefore more likely to overestimate potential 
additional revenue for goods with high tax rates, such as those with large excises (fuel, alcohol, 
tobacco). Where these goods have low price elasticities of demand, this will serve to counteract the 
above ceteris paribus effect of high tax rates. 
In each of these cases, however, the conventional tax gap will appear to have been eliminated – 
there are no longer any tax-free goods. From our general definition of the tax gap earlier, we can 
specify it in this case as:      
    . But, as shown in (11), the imposition of the tax rate on the 
non-compliant yields actual tax revenue from them of       
  which is equal to their theoretical tax 
liability,   
 . However, whereas   
  is unchanged in the case of  = 0, it is reduced to zero when 
       . 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Measures of „tax gaps‟ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection 
under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures, used by revenue 
agencies, of tax non-compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. This article has argued, 
however, that the tax gap as conventionally defined is flawed because it fails to capture behavioural 
responses by taxpayers. This is despite the fact that tax gap estimates are frequently used to motivate 
compliance efforts by revenue agencies that seek to elicit behavioural responses (of a different sort) 
from taxpayers. 
In essence, an improvement in taxpayer compliance implies an increase in those taxpayers‟ 
effective marginal tax rates which, in turn, can be expected to induce a reduction in the relevant tax 
base. This may involve a loss of total tax revenue and/or a switching of the relevant tax base towards 
those that face lower effective tax rates, such as when personal taxpayers incorporate in response to 
personal marginal income tax rates in excess of corporate rates. 
These tax base responses are not immutable but rather are a function of the tax code and the legal 
and policy parameters that represent the complete tax „system‟. For example, the ability of taxpayers 
to switch between different taxes in order to reduce their tax liabilities, is partly determined by the 
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legal rules, administrative costs, policy choices, etc. associated with the existing tax regimes. To 
reduce behavioural responses, changing these „rules‟ may be a better approach to raising compliance 
than seeking to reduce the tax gap associated with the existing regime.
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We have shown that tax gap measures both for indirect taxes (such as the „VAT-gap‟) and direct 
(income) taxes, in the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of collectable 
„missing revenue‟. Conventional tax gap measures are often used to motivate reforms designed to 
increase the tax compliance rate and realise the missing revenue. However, where these efforts to 
reduce non-compliance are successful, in the sense of reducing the tax gap towards zero, this would 
be expected to be associated with a lower tax base and lower total revenues from the tax than the ex 
ante tax gap estimate implies. In short, some of the „missing revenue‟ is not recoverable and 
essentially non-existent! This is not merely a case of the „last dollar‟ of missing revenue being 
impossible to collect (as is well-recognised), but rather that a fraction of all so-called missing revenue 
may be impossible to collect. 
Finally, it might reasonably be objected that the alternative tax gap measure proposed here 
requires information on behavioural responses that are not available or are not sufficiently reliable. 
However, where there is a high probability that behavioural responses to compliance improvement 
exist, adopting an assumption of zero response is clearly a biased „central estimate‟. Even a low 
assumed value of a behavioural response elasticity would improve tax gap accuracy than the 
conventional approach. Uncertainties around this estimate might also serve to highlight the more 
general uncertainties surrounding the methods and magnitude of all tax gap estimates. In particular, 
the conventional measure can give the spurious impression of accuracy because it appears to be based 
more on „known‟ data, such as the currently observed tax base, to project a full-compliance 
equivalent. 
  
                                                 
18
 This alternative approach is referred to by IMF (2013a) as changing the „policy gap‟ as opposed to changing the 
„compliance gap‟. 
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Figure 1: Comparing Tax Gap Measures 
 
 
Figure 2A: The Tax Revenue – Tax Base ‘Laffer Curve’ 
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 Figure 2B: ‘Conventional’ and ‘True’ Tax Gaps 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2C: Effects of Changing Tax and Compliance Rates 
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 Figure 3: Indirect Tax Gaps and Cigarette Taxation 
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